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Ontology 
Ontology, or metaphysics after the title given to Aristotle's 'first philosophy' , is investigation 
of the nature, structure and constitution of reality. The term 'ontology' is cognate with the Latín 
ens, existing thing or entity, from the verb esse to be, so that ontology may also be characterized 
simply as investigation of that which exists. As such, ontology is distinct from other branches 
ofphilosophy, such as epistemology, which concerns the nature ofknowledge, and logic, which 
concerns the nature of valid reasoning. Entity in the most basic sense includes individual things 
(or particulars), properties, relations, events, states of affairs, sets and so on, any of which, 
according to different philosophical views, may or may not be reducible to one another. For 
example, one might ask whether space and time should be thought of as particular types of 
individual things, within which we find more familiar types of individuals, or whether space 
and time should be thought of as (systems of) relations between individual things. Similar! y, 
one might ask whether properties are reducible to sets of things, whether individual things are 
reducible to series of events, and so on. 
In recent years, two positions regarding ontology have attracted the attention of economic 
methodologists. On the one hand, there are proponents of ontological realism, the view that 
the world is populated by real objects independent of our experience, and that these objects 
possess properties and enter into relations with one another independently of our understanding 
of them. On the other hand, there is the idealist view that the idea of objects with properties 
and relations independent of our experience and conception is incoherent, since any idea is a 
form of conception, and we cannot conceive what is independent of conception. This latter view 
seems to have recently enjoyed something of a reviva) among economic methodologists, but 
there are at least two good reasons to question it. 
First, the expression 'our experience and conception' presupposes that there exist many 
individuals, who presumably possess properties and stand in various relations to one another 
largely independently of each other's experience and understanding. Thus it cannot be denied 
that sorne things exist independently of someone's conception. But if sorne things exist 
independently of someone's conception, it is possible that sorne things exist independently of 
anyone's conception and thus that ontological realism is true at sorne level. The eighteenth-
century Irish idealist philosopher Berkeley saw the logic of this argument, and sought to 
escape it by assuming that God perceived everything (Berkeley, 171 0). Modern philosophers, 
scientists and economic methodologists, however, tend to adopt a more secular perspective, 
accept the existence of many finite minds and are by and large ontological realist. 
Second, the view that things do not exist independently of conception necessitates our 
explaining what exists in terms of what we m ay conceive. But we may conceive of many sorts 
of things as existing, including fabulous and imaginary things such as unicorns and green cheese 
moons. What, then, distinguishes conceiving that a particular tree we see before us exists from 
conceiving that a unicorn exists? Lacking the standard realist de vice of saying that the tree exists 
in conception and in an independent reality, but that the unicorn only exists in conception, the 
idealist must differentiate between kinds of existence appropriate to different kind of things. 
But this runs contrary toa widely held intuition that one can say that things either exist or they 
do not, in that the idealist must say that unicoms exist in one sense, but not in sorne other. A 
related problem in the history of pre-modem philosophy arises in connection with the ontological 
argument (compare Plantinga, 1965), in which the mediaeval scholastics argued that God's 
possessing the property of perfection, which we m ay conceive as necessary to the meaning of 
344 The handbook of economic methodology 
God, proved that God exists. But that God's perfection may be conceived does not prove God 
exists in the sense that we believe that trees exist. Essentially, then, that the scholastics 
believed that conceiving God's perfection demonstrated God's existence tumed on an ambiguity 
in the concept of existence. 
In general, it seems fair to say that the majority of modero philosophers regard existence and 
conception as ontologically distinct and irreducible domains, and that they also subscribe to 
sorne form of ontological realism. Debate, nonetheless, has attached to the question of whether 
ontological investigation of any sort, realist or otherwise, is philosophically prornising, and 
whether philosophers should restrict themselves to epistemology, logic and analysis as modes 
of inquiry. Thus Moore (1911) argued that neo-Hegelian idealism ofBrad1ey and McTaggart 
violated the claims of common sense. Following the early Wittgenstein, the logical positivist 
Vienna Circle treated metaphysical (or ontological) propositions as meaningless. Carnap 
(1932) in particular asserted, 'The meaning of a statement lies in the method of its verification ' 
and argued that, since metaphysical statements were incapable of verification, they were 
therefore meaningless. In response, Popper ( 1934) proposed that verifiability be replaced by 
falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics- notas a criterion 
of meaning- and then suggested that metaphysical ideas could be quite useful for science. Indeed, 
he went on to argue that theories may initially be metaphysical in nature and then later play 
heuristic roles in the forrnulation of scientific hypotheses: 'Atornism is an excellent example 
of a non-testable metaphysical theory whose influence upon science has exceeded that of many 
testable scientific theories' (Popper, 1983: 192). Against this, Quine, following Duhem in what 
has cometo be known as the Duhem-Quine thesis, noted that falsifiability is not a successful 
demarcation criterion, denied that science and metaphysics could be sharply distinguished and 
warned of the danger of 'a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics 
and natural science' (Quine, 1951: 20). Better, in his view, to concentrate on science which 
alone provides genuine knowledge. 
However, science and its empirical practices, as well as common sense, clearly all presuppose 
various ontological commitments, such as the idea that every event has a cause, the idea that 
our experiences are generated by things in the world and the idea that the world is populated 
by individuals with whom we interact in science and ordinary life. Thus, however difficult it 
may be to explain the nature of these commitments and their relation to science and common 
sense, that such comrnitments underlie our thinking seems adequate justification for their 
investigation. Moreover, though ontological or metaphysical propositions lack the status of being 
the sort of well-confirrned beliefs which scientific knowledge aspires to produce, metaphysics 
may still be regarded as a realm of belief in which distinct propositions may be rationally 
exarnined and disputed. An arguably more important posture towards ontology, then, concems 
what attitude we ought to take towards the explanation of our ontological commitments. 
Should we be content to describe common sense and scientific views ofthe structure and nature 
of reality - a descriptivist metaphysics (Strawson, 1959) - or should we rather engage in a 
revisionary metaphysics that aims to develop a self-consistent ontological system? 
These two projects are not always sharply distinguishable, but the former descriptivist 
project is sometimes associated with producing accounts of the most basic sorts or categories 
of entities (individual things or particulars, properties, relations, events, states of affairs and 
so on) presupposed in a science or discourse under investigation. Aristotle asked whether sorne 
things endure through time and through change in their properties and relations; that is, 
whether sorne things were substances. Thus in connection with neoclassical econornics we rnight 
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ask whether individuals are substances, or whether comparative statics analysis requires that 
they be treated as temporal series of momentary individuals with no essential connection. 
Relatedly, are firms substances that we may modelas intentional beings, orare they nothing 
but bundles of properties and relations lacking any particular unity? Aristotle also distinguished 
between substances' essential and accidental properties, or between those properties required 
and not required for their existence. Economics might be said to encounter this distinction in 
the debate over whether mathematical forrnalization captures accidental rather than essential 
characteristics of individuals and fmns, and thus whether formal theories are 'about' real world 
individuals. 
The latter revisionist project may be associated with broad ontological views, such as 
realism, idealism, materialism, dualism, nominalism, holism and organicism. For example, 
materialism is the view that everything can be satisfactorily explained in naturalistic terms, where 
this implies, arnong other things, that mental states are brain states; or organicism is the view 
that the relations between things are internal, and as such explain their relata, or the things they 
relate. Often, however, individual philosophers subscribe to combinations of views, where how 
these views are structured and identified is a matter of prior views held about the nature of basic 
ontological categories. One might thus be a realist with respect to particulars, believing that 
they indeed existas self-subsistent things, but be a nominalist or conceptualist with respect to 
their properties, believing that the predicates we use to characterize individual things do not 
refer to really existing properties. Alternatively, one rnight be a realist in the Platonist sense 
of believing that properties we predicate of things truly exist, and that things ' instantiate' or 
instance properties. Things, on this view, are always of a particular kind or sort. 
Properties, characteristics, attributes, qualities, meanings and so on - perhaps the most 
disputed over and most complex of ontological categories - are generally referred to as 
universals by philosophers. Our interest in them asan ontological category derives in part from 
the fact that they constitute a subject matter from which knowledge is constructed, whether this 
is a matter of general episternic relationships (such as when we ask about the relationship between 
income distribution and consumption) ora matter of our knowledge about particular things (such 
as when we ask about the income and consumption of particular individuals). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, then, ontological views often underlie epistemological ones. If one is a realist with 
respect to particular things yet a nominalist with respect to their properties, one is more likely 
to be empiricist in orientation. If one is a realist with respect to properties, since properties are 
generally not thought to be spatiotemporal in nature, one is more likely to invest less significance 
in empirical work and to be rationalist or formalist in orientation. Accordingly, methodological 
differences regarding how knowledge is organized and constructed often relate to differing 
opinions about the constituents ofknowledge, which in turn link up with differing opinions about 
what is thought to be knowable according to what is thought to actually exist. 
In economics, the question of what is thought to actually exist is central to one of the 
longest and most intractable ontological disputes. In classical política] economy (and its 
subsequent reviva]), classes are said to exist, acquiring most clearly in Marx' s thinking the status 
of agents over and above the collections .(or sets) of individuals that make them up. In 
neoclassical economics, in contrast, individuals alone are thought to exist and actas agents, 
classes are not regarded as real, but constitute merely conceptual constructions. Methodological 
collectivism and methodological individualism, that is, are rooted in opposed ontological 
commitments that underlie entire research programmes and their associated epistemological 
strategies. Related disputes exist between old and new institutionalists and between proponents 
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of individualist microfoundations for macroeconomics and proponents of an aggregative 
macroeconomics of a more holistic nature. In the latter dispute, those who propose individualist-
reductionist accounts of macroeconomic relationships often reason that these relationships are 
theoretical constructions that must be explained in terrns of the choices individuals make, the 
reason being that only individuals exist. Those who believe it is unnecessary to reduce 
aggregative relationships to individual action suppose that these relationships are real in and 
of themselves, and as such are objects of investigation. 
Evaluation of these ontological positions by philosophers and economic methodologists 
involves what has been labelled above as descriptive metaphysics. Determining what sorts of 
agents or entities exist in economic life may be investigated in classic Aristotelian terms as a 
set of questions conceming whether one type of entity is reducible to or subsumed within another, 
and whether individuation and identity conditions are satisfied with respect to entities proposed 
as real. Ontological investigations of this sort are not likely to dispel classic oppositions in 
orientation between economists, but they may, as Popper suggested, perrnit formulation of 
scientific hypotheses regarding the nature and scope of economic agency that, if not directly 
testable, may nonetheless be subject to empirical and theoretical examination. 
JOHN B. DA VIS 
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Operationalism 
Operationalism was established as a philosophical term by Percy Bridgman' s book, The Logic 
of Modern Physics in 1927, although historians have traced essentially similar uses of the term 
by other American physical scientists in the frrst decades of the twentieth century (Moyer, 1991 : 
381 ). In his seminal text, Bridgman defined the concept as follows ( 1961 : 5): 
In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous 
with the corresponding set of operations. If the concept is physical, as of length, the operations are actual 
physical operations, those by which length is measured; or if the concept is mental, as of mathematical 
continuity, the operations are mental operations, namely those by which we determine whether a gi ven 
aggregate of magnitudes is continuous. 
Bridgman, although a Nobel Prize winner in physics, always prided himself upon a plain-
spoken style, and in his book he made it seem as though his doctrine was little more than a 
restatement of the homespun wisdom that ' the true meaning of a terrn is to be observing what 
aman does with it, not what he says about it' (ibid.: 7). In order to conflate meaning with action 
